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iInternational investment—more specifically, foreign direct investment (FDI)—has become the most important vehicle to bring 
goods and services to foreign markets. In addition, FDI integrates the national production systems of individual countries and is 
in the process of creating an integrated international production system, the productive core of the globalising world economy. 
Against the background of the salient features of FDI and the emerging integrated international production system, this paper seeks 
to do three things—one, to discuss the evolution of national FDI policies; two, to review challenges for the international investment 
law and policy regime; and, three, to identify options on how some of these challenges can be met. The discussion is broader than 
focusing on priority issues only; rather, it covers a range of issues that may eventually need to be addressed. The emphasis is on 
the international governance of international investment in the globalising world economy, which so far has taken place through 
a myriad of mostly bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The resulting regime—which increasingly sets the parameters for domestic 
policy-making on international investment—has developed rapidly, remains in flux, and needs to be improved to maintain its 
effectiveness and legitimacy. 
National (as well as international) policy-making regarding MNEs and their international investment takes place in the context 
of sets of tensions for governments seeking to attract FDI and benefit from it as much as possible, and minimise any negative 
effects. Hence, national policies regarding FDI, and the international regulatory framework within which national policies are 
formulated, are of key importance for host countries, and they can conflict with the goals of MNEs to maximise their international 
competitiveness and global profits. In the 1990s, countries began to establish investment promotion agencies with the specific brief 
to attract as much FDI as possible. Since the turn of this century, however, national approaches in both developed countries and 
emerging markets towards incoming FDI have become more nuanced. Achieving the right balance has become a key challenge for 
countries, and it is one that emerging markets, especially with regard to outward FDI by their firms, increasingly need to consider. 
A defining characteristic of the investment regime is that investors have a private right to action when seeking redress, under 
the investor-state dispute-settlement (ISDS) mechanism enshrined in the majority of IIAs. From the perspective of international 
investors, this is a strong and positive feature of the investment regime, but it entails considerable risks for host country 
governments. A topical and urgent question is whether appeals mechanisms for current ad-hoc tribunals, a world investment 
court as a standing first-instance tribunal making the decision in any dispute settlement case, or a combination of both should be 
established. Institutionalising dispute settlement in this manner would be a major step towards improving the investment regime. 
Difficult as it is to improve the current dispute settlement mechanism, embarking on a process of examining how this could be 
done, with a view towards bringing a better mechanism into being, would send a strong signal that governments recognise that the 
ISDS mechanism would benefit from improvement.
An independent Advisory Centre on International Investment Law would help to establish a level playing field by providing 
administrative and legal assistance to respondents that face investor claims and are themselves not in a position to defend 
themselves adequately. The WTO experience provides useful inspiration. An Advisory Centre on International Investment Law—
which would suitably complement a reform of the ISDS mechanism—could do the same thing for the international investment 
regime. Related questions could be pursued in a working group consisting of representatives from principal stakeholders. It could be 
serviced by an NGO with a track record of work on the international trading system. It could, hopefully, also draw on the experience 
of intergovernmental organisations with an interest in this subject.
The growing criticism of the investment regime suggests that a new balance is required. This begins with the objectives of IIAs, 
more and more of which recognise, in their preambles, objectives other than protection, as well as the right to regulate. It also 
includes the continuing demand that foreign investors, like domestic investors, have responsibilities too, and not only host 
countries. Unless the regime can be made more holistic, reflecting in a balanced manner the interests of all principal stakeholders 
and defining the relationships between foreign investors and governments in general, it risks losing its legitimacy in the longer run. 
There is also the question whether the ideal approach would be to have one instrument that defined the relationships between 
governments and international investors—a universal framework on international investment that, in a coherent and transparent 
manner, would provide the predictability and stability that long-term investment needs. If a truly universal framework is considered 
out of reach at this time, one might want to consider whether a plurilateral framework on international investment could serve as a 
first step in that direction. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ii
Concluding, the paper suggests that it would be desirable to launch an informal but inclusive confidence-, consensus- and bridge-
building process on how the international investment law and policy regime can be improved. Such a process could seek to identify 
systematically the strengths and weaknesses of the current regime and discuss how to deal with them. It could also consider a 
number of the issues that were discussed as not being FDI/international investment proper, as many of them are intimately linked 
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1International investment—more specifically, foreign direct 
investment (FDI)—has become the most important vehicle 
to bring goods and services to foreign markets—the sales of 
foreign affiliates in 2013 were estimated at US$35 trillion, 
while world exports were US$23 trillion. In addition, FDI 
integrates the national production systems of individual 
countries and is in the process of creating an integrated 
international production system, the productive core of the 
globalising world economy. 
Against the background of the salient features of FDI and 
the emerging integrated international production system, 
this paper seeks to do three things—one, to discuss the 
evolution of national FDI policies; two, to review challenges 
for the international investment law and policy regime; and, 
three, to identify options on how some of these challenges 
can be met. The discussion is broader than focusing on 
priority issues only; rather, it covers a range of issues that 
may eventually need to be addressed. The emphasis is on 
the international governance of international investment in 
the globalising world economy, which so far has taken place 
through a myriad of mostly bilateral treaties. The resulting 
regime—which increasingly sets the parameters for domestic 
policy-making on international investment—has developed 
rapidly over the past few decades. It remains in flux and 
needs to be improved further to maintain its effectiveness 
and legitimacy. 
SALIENT FEATURES
The importance of international investment
Firms undertake the lion’s share of FDI, commonly defined 
as investment that involves control over foreign assets. 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
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control is assumed to exist if a foreign investor (among 
other things) owns at least 10 percent of the shares of 
a foreign company (“foreign affiliate”). However, there 
are also various forms of non-equity relationships (for 
example, management contracts, franchising arrangements) 
that also confer control over assets located abroad. In a 
broader definition of international investment, anything 
that involves a value controlled by foreign firms can be 
considered a foreign investment, in the sense that it can raise 
issues similar to those associated with FDI as traditionally 
defined. Unfortunately, though, systematic time-series 
data are available only for FDI. Thus, these data are an 
underestimation of international production, that is, assets 
that are under the common governance of parent firms 
(multinational enterprises—MNEs).
To return to the better-documented part of the 
phenomenon, at least 100,000 MNEs control at least 
1 million foreign affiliates (even under the conventional 
definition of FDI, these figures underestimate the number of 
MNEs and their foreign affiliates considerably). Some 70,000 
of these MNEs are headquartered in member countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD; developed countries, for short), and some 30,000 
in non-OECD countries (emerging markets, for short). They 
were responsible for US$1.3 trillion of FDI inflows in 2014, 
compared to about average annual inflows of US$50 billion 
during the first half on the 1980s. Much FDI takes the form 
of mergers and acquisitions (M&As), regardless of whether 
parent firms are headquartered in developed countries or 
emerging markets. The world stock of FDI at the end of 
2013 stood at US$26 trillion. While the biggest MNEs might 
control some two-thirds of the world’s FDI stock, most 
MNEs are small or medium-size enterprises. These often 
have limited capabilities to access finance and information 
about investment opportunities, or staff international 
operations and deal with difficulties in host countries should 
they arise. As a result, they face special obstacles in their 
multinationalisation process.
Multinational enterprises, regardless of whether they hail 
from developed countries or emerging markets, have 
invested in all sectors and throughout the world. The services 
sector alone accounts for around two-thirds of the world’s 
investment flows and stock, and natural resources for almost 
one-tenth. Traditionally, the developed countries attracted 
most FDI flows, but now emerging markets receive more 
than half of these (US$745 billion in 2014). When it comes 
to the world’s accumulated inward FDI stock, however, 
the developed countries are still by far in the lead, hosting 
almost two-thirds of it. 
Apart from the rising attractiveness of emerging markets 
for FDI flows, an important recent development has been 
the rise of firms from these countries as outward investors. 
From virtually negligible amounts a decade or two ago, 
outward FDI from emerging markets reached US$550 
billion (or 41 percent of the world total) in 2014, more than 
ten times what world FDI flows had been during the first 
2half of the 1980s. Firms headquartered in 138 emerging 
markets on which data were available had, in 2013, an 
accumulated stock of outward FDI, and 75 of them reported 
FDI outflows for every year during the period 2009–2013. At 
the same time, though—and as in the case of the developed 
countries—a few countries dominate these outflows. 
Taking average FDI outflows during 2011–2013 as the basis 
(and excluding financial centres and tax havens), the top 
three outward investing emerging markets were China 
(US$88 billion), the Russian Federation (US$70 billion), and 
Singapore (US$21 billion). 
China is by far the leader. It is not only the largest host 
country for FDI among emerging markets (attracting US$128 
billion in 2014), but also the largest FDI home country—
Chinese firms invested an estimated US$116 billion abroad 
in 2014, a good part of it channelled through Hong Kong 
and other financial centres and tax havens. China’s outward 
FDI flows will likely overtake the country’s inward flows 
in 2015 or 2016. A salient feature of China’s FDI abroad 
is that some four-fifths is undertaken by state-controlled 
entities, overwhelmingly state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
especially the 115 centrally controlled ones. China’s outward 
investors are helped by the country’s regulatory framework 
for outward FDI. This framework has moved over time from 
restricting, to facilitating, supporting, and encouraging 
outward FDI (even if this framework still has strong elements 
of administrative control that make it cumbersome). 
It is very likely that the growth of FDI, including from emerging 
markets, will continue, for various reasons. The basic one is 
that demand for investment will remain high, as investment 
is central to economic growth and development. In an 
increasingly digital world economy, further, knowledge-
intensive investment—precisely the type that FDI often is—
is at a premium. For example, delivering the United Nations’ 
Sustainable Development Goals over the period 2015–2030 
alone requires that an annual investment gap of between 
US$2–3 trillion will need to be financed. Independently of 
these goals, global infrastructure needs by 2030 will require 
financing a gap of US$ 15–20 trillion. FDI would have to rise 
significantly to help fill these gaps, considering that bilateral 
and multilateral official development assistance and lending, 
domestic resource mobilisation in developing countries, and 
various innovative sources of finance for development are 
very unlikely to be sufficient for this purpose. 
In principle, this should not be impossible—FDI flows 
accounted only for a small share of all investment worldwide, 
about 8 percent in 2013, a share that was higher in 
developing countries (9 percent) compared to developed 
ones (7 percent). At the same time, the share of FDI in the 
total investment in individual economies can be as high 
as 52 percent in Malawi, 51 percent in Cambodia, and 30 
percent in Chile. In 2007, it was 26 percent in Poland and 
39 percent in the United Kingdom (UK). It can even be 
higher than domestic investment (for example, 221 percent 
in Mozambique and 153 percent in Ireland in 2013). In key 
industries, FDI is often considerable. This suggests that there 
is room for the further growth of FDI flows if conditions are 
right for long-term investment.
There are a number of reservoirs for further FDI. Investors that 
have already invested abroad can expand their operations 
and entice other firms (for example, their suppliers) to 
follow them abroad. Emerging market firms have just begun 
to venture abroad, and not only firms headquartered in 
big emerging markets but also in small ones. The stock of 
outward FDI by sovereign wealth funds is minimal so far, 
amounting to less than US$150 billion. Newly privatised 
SOEs often have a limited presence abroad and are likely to 
expand into foreign markets. The great majority of small and 
medium-sized enterprises are only at the beginning of the 
multinationalisation process. An increasing number of firms are 
“born global,” that is, they establish themselves abroad within 
a very short period of time after they have been created. And 
the growth of global value chains, including as a result of the 
increased tradability of services, represents an FDI source that 
can be tapped. 
Thus, the reservoir for additional FDI is considerable. 
Governments are very likely increasingly to tap this reservoir 
because such investment is of a long-term nature (unlike 
portfolio investment and bank lending), and can bring a 
package of tangible and intangible assets (including capital, 
technology, skills, management know-how, marketing 
capabilities, access to markets) to host economies, be they 
developed or developing. These assets are important to 
create employment and, more generally, advance economic 
growth and development and bring about the transition to a 
carbon-free world economy to halt climate change. However, 
FDI can also have negative effects. Host countries often fear, 
for instance, that MNEs resort to abusive transfer pricing 
and avoid taxes, use restrictive business practices, engage 
in unfair competition that crowds out otherwise viable local 
firms, become a burden on the balance of payments, or 
jeopardise national security. However, since, on balance, 
the impact of FDI is considered positive, competition for 
such investment is likely to be intense, including by offering 
incentives and otherwise facilitating it.
Motives and determinants
Whether governments can successfully tap the reservoir for 
FDI depends on the motivations for firms to invest abroad, as 
well as the nature of the FDI determinants that characterise 
host countries.
Firms locate production abroad for essentially four sets of 
reasons—they seek to serve foreign markets better (market-
seeking FDI), especially when trade is not an alternative (as 
for many services). They seek to increase the efficiency of 
their operations, especially by tapping into lower labour 
costs elsewhere (efficiency-seeking FDI). They seek to access 
natural resources (resource-seeking FDI). Or they seek to 
acquire such assets as technology or brand names (asset-
seeking FDI). These motivations, in various combinations, 
are most likely to remain the driving forces for MNEs in the 
3future as well when they decide whether to invest abroad (as 
opposed to, say, export).
These motives, in turn, interact with the three principal sets 
of factors that determine where abroad MNEs decide to 
locate the production of goods and services—the economic 
determinants, the regulatory framework, and investment 
promotion. 
The single most important among them are the economic 
determinants, in particular the size and growth of a market, 
the quality of the infrastructure and supplier base, and the 
cost and quality of skilled labour, other production factors, 
and science and technology resources. Natural resource-
seeking investment apart, the availability of such assets 
determines to a large extent the locational choices of firms 
seeking to invest abroad. The economic determinants will 
remain the single most important factor in the future as well, 
as they govern whether or not a given investment location 
contributes to the international competitiveness of firms and, 
hence, ultimately their profitability. 
At the same time, for any FDI to take place it is necessary 
that the regulatory framework is enabling: It needs to 
allow foreign firms to undertake FDI. This second set of 
FDI determinants has to be present. But the regulatory 
framework does not have to be perfect, as the governing set 
of determinants are economic ones. 
The third set of FDI determinants consists of investment 
promotion. This set of determinants has become more 
important as the FDI regulatory framework has become 
more similar. Accordingly, virtually every country has 
established investment promotion agencies since the mid-
1990s, increasingly also at the sub-national level. These are 
in fierce competition with each other to attract FDI, resulting 
in a highly competitive world FDI market. The effectiveness 
of such agencies can be important, at least for emerging 
markets, for attracting investment, assuming that the 
economic FDI determinants are in place and the regulatory 
framework is enabling.
The improvement of the economic determinants in 
emerging markets, combined with an enabling regulatory 
FDI framework and active efforts to attract FDI, explains to a 
large extent why emerging markets have become the leading 
destination of FDI flows in the past few years. Progress 
towards the Sustainable Development Goals—reduced 
poverty, improved education, health and nutrition, and an 
expanding middle class—will make the emerging markets 
even more attractive to FDI in the future.
RISE OF AN INTEGRATED INTERNATIONAL 
PRODUCTION SYSTEM
The growth of FDI and the way it is organised has led to the 
emergence of an integrated international production system. 
Firms locate specific activities wherever it is best for them to 
maintain or increase their international competitiveness—
and, hence, ultimately their profitability. This concerns not 
only the production of “nuts and bolts,” so to speak, but 
increasingly also various components of service activities and, 
indeed, various headquarters functions.
Locating manufacturing production abroad has traditionally 
been an approach taken by firms that engaged in market-
seeking FDI. What is relatively new is that MNEs have 
moved to an international intra-firm division of labour 
by building corporate networks of foreign and domestic 
affiliates that specialise in the production of various 
parts and components that, eventually, are assembled 
in any location in the world best suited for this purpose. 
Moreover, firms that are not tied to particular parent firms 
through ownership arrangements are becoming part of the 
production networks of these parent firms through non-
equity arrangements. The value chains that are the result are 
often regionally centred, especially in Asia (although they are 
typically referred to as “global” value chains). While parent 
firms remain the ultimate decision-makers in these value 
chains, the role of headquarters increasingly becomes that 
of deciding where various production activities take place, 
organising a highly complex network, providing key tangible 
and intangible assets (for example, finance, brand names, 
research and development), orchestrating information 
and knowledge flows within the network, and ensuring 
that profits are maximised globally for the enterprise 
as a whole. The emergence of such complex networks 
coordinated by headquarters makes it difficult at times 
to identify the boundaries of a particular firm or, for that 
matter, to determine liability in case of, for instance, gross 
negligence. It also means that the distinction between host 
and home countries is losing its sharpness. This, in turn, has 
implications, for example, for questions related to taxation, 
where to put legal titles for patents and trademarks, and 
for determining corporate nationality (important, among 
other things, for the question of standing in international 
investment disputes).
Another new aspect is that the splitting up of the value 
chain is being extended to the production of services, a 
process that roughly started around the turn of the century 
and is continuing to gather speed. Advances in information 
technology were key to this development. 
Given that most services are intangible, they traditionally 
needed to be produced when and where they were 
consumed—they were not tradable. Hence services firms—be 
they in banking, insurance, accounting, health, architecture, 
research and development, legal services, or any other 
services sector—seeking to expand abroad had to establish 
themselves in the markets they planned to serve. (This is 
also reflected in that the bulk of FDI is in the services sector.) 
Advances in information technology, however, have made it 
possible for the information part of a range of services—and 
many services are information intensive—to be captured 
digitally, stored, and sent to any location when and where 
4that information is required: Services have become tradable. 
This “tradability revolution,” in turn, makes it possible for 
service firms to split up the production process and locate, 
as in the case of manufacturing, the production of various 
service components wherever it is best for them from the 
perspective of furthering their international competitiveness. 
In this manner, integrated international production and 
the global value chains associated with it are now being 
extended to the services sector.
The possibility of splitting up the production of services 
extends also to the various functions that are traditionally 
performed by corporate headquarters, ranging from 
communications to finance. They too can be located 
wherever it is best from the perspective of firms as a whole, 
disassembling what once were unified headquarters. It is a 
process that has begun, but still far from having run its course.
In aggregation, these value chains of integrated international 
production add up to the expanding integrated international 
production system that is the productive core of the 
globalising world economy. 
The emergence of such a system and the global value chains 
that define it—which is taking place, as it does, within 
the framework of an enabling national and international 
investment law and policy framework (to be discussed 
below)—puts to rest the old question of whether FDI leads to 
trade or trade leads to FDI. Rather, the question becomes—
where do firms locate their production facilities, be it to 
produce goods or services? If the location is at home, it is 
domestic investment; if the location is abroad, it is FDI. As 
production becomes more fragmented, the locational outcome 
may involve multiple facilities, and the resulting transactions 
may comprise domestic sales, sales by affiliates overseas, and 
intermediate trade of products, parts and components within 
corporate networks. FDI and trade are necessary complements 
for integrated international production. 
The intertwinement of investment and trade has policy 
implications. This has been recognised in the Agreement on 
Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs) by addressing 
restrictive and distorting effects that certain investment 
measures may have for trade in goods. Additional measures 
are prohibited in other international investment agreements 
(IIAs), especially bilateral investment treaties (BITs). There is 
also the question of incentives used to attract FDI, an issue 
addressed briefly elsewhere in this text. On the other hand, 
there are investment-related trade measures that can distort 
investment flows. Particularly important here are rules of 
origin. Unlike trade-related investment measures, the latter 
have received little attention in multilateral disciplines.
Item Value at current prices (Billions of dollars)
1990 2005-7 (pre-crisis average) 2011 2012 2013
FDI inflows 208 1 493 1 700 1 330 1 452
FDI outflows 241 1 532 1 712 1 347 1 411
FDI inward stock 2 078 14 790 2 1117 23 304 25 464
FDI outward stock 2 088 15 884 21 913 23 916 26 313
Income on inward FDI a 79 1 072 1 603 1 581 1 748
Rate of return on inward FDI b 3.8 7.3 6.9 7.6 6.8
Income on outward FDI c 126 1 135 1 550 1 509 1 622
Rate of return on outward FDI d 6.0 7.2 6.5 7.1 6.3
Cross-border M & As 111 780 556 332 349
Sales of foreign affiliates 4 723 21 469 28 516 31 532 c 34 508 c
Value-added (product) of foreign affiliates 881 4 878 6 262 7 089 c 7 492 c
Total assets of foreign affiliates 3 893 42 179 83 754 89 568 c 96 625 c
Exports of foreign affiliates 1 498 5 012 d 7 463 d 7 532 d 7 721 d
Employment by foreign affiliates (thousands) 20 625 53 306 63 416 67 155 c 70 726 c
Memorandum:
GDP 22 327 51 288 71 314 72 807 74 284
Gross fixed capital information 5 072 11 801 16 498 17 171 17 673
Royalties and license fee receipts 29 161 250 253 259
Exports of goods and services 4 107 15 034 22 386 22 593 e 23 160 e
TABLE 1:
Selected Indicators of Foreign Direct Investment and International Production, 
2013 and Selected Years
Source: UNCTAD (2014): World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs. An 
Action Plan, Geneva,  p. 30.
a Based on data from 179 countries for income on inward FDI and 145 countries for 
income on outward FDI in 2013, in both cases representing more than 90 per cent 
of global inward and outward stocks.
b  Calculated only for countries with both FDI income and stock data.
c  Data for 2012 and 2013 are estimated using a fixed effects panel regression of each 
variable against outward stock and lagged dependent variable for the period 1980-
2010
d  Data for 1995-1997 are based on a linear regression of exports of foreign affiliates 
against inward FDI stock for the period 1982-1994. For 1998-2013, the share of 
exports of foreign affiliates in world exports in 1998 (33.3 percent) was applied to 
obtain values.
e  Data from IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2014
5The prevalence of the integrated international production 
system is reflected in that some one-third of world 
trade takes place as intra-firm trade, that is, among the 
various parts of the same MNEs. Beyond intra-firm trade, 
approximately 80 percent of global gross trade involves 
MNEs in one way or another. Of that, approximately 
42 percent is intra-firm trade, approximately 16 percent 
happens through non-equity modes (which include contract 
manufacturing, licensing and franchising) and approximately 
42 percent occurs through arm’s-length transactions 
involving at least one MNE. Similarly, a substantial share of 
international technology transfer—especially the transfer 
of tacit technology—takes place within this integrated 
international production system. 
This new reality underscores the importance of the locational 
FDI determinants. While the economic determinants will 
remain paramount, an open investment and trade regime is 
the precondition for the further growth of global value chains 
under the common governance of parent firms that, in turn, 
make key corporate decisions. 
But this new reality also entails risks. For MNEs, they are 
related to possible disruptions of their global value chains, 
especially when they work under just-in-time production 
conditions. Such risks can stem from natural disasters, such 
as the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan—international 
supply chains involving Japanese suppliers were severely 
disrupted, at significant costs for the firms involved. But 
supply chain disruptions can also result from political risks, 
such as adverse regulatory changes, breach of contract, civil 
disturbances, expropriation, terrorism, and civil war. National 
and international investment insurance coverage has still to 
take into account that political risks no longer can have only 
implications for the operations of a firm in one particular 
country, but may have negative implication in other parts of 
a firm’s global value chain.
Be that as it may, FDI and non-equity forms of control by 
MNEs over foreign production facilities have become more 
important than trade in delivering goods and services to 
foreign markets—as already mentioned, the sales of foreign 
affiliates alone in 2013 amounted to about US$35 trillion, 
compared to world exports of about US$23 trillion (Table 
1). Moreover, a substantial part of trade flows is through the 
global value chains governed by MNEs. FDI and non-equity 
forms of control, as the most important form of international 
economic transactions, integrate not just national markets 
through trade, but also national production systems. This 
raises questions about the governance of international 
investment and, in particular, the relations between investors 
and governments. 
TENSIONS
National (as well as international) policy-making regarding 
MNEs and their international investment takes place in 
the context of sets of tensions for governments seeking 
to attract FDI and benefit from it as much as possible—the 
global corporate interests of MNEs versus the national 
development interests of countries; foreign versus domestic 
ownership; policies to attract FDI versus policies to maximise 
its benefits; and a country’s interest as a host country versus 
its interests as a home country. And the constraints of the 
emerging integrated international production system, a 
globalising world economy and international investment law 
versus the need for policy space in the interest of pursuing 
legitimate public policy objectives. To illustrate two of 
these tensions—MNEs evaluate the benefit of each of their 
FDI projects in relation to maximising their competitiveness 
and profitability within the framework of their own global 
corporate networks, while governments seek to maximise 
the benefits of the same projects within their own territorial 
boundaries. Or, as host countries, governments seek to 
maintain policy space to pursue their own legitimate public 
policy objectives, while, as home countries, governments 
seek to protect the investment of their own firms abroad and 
to facilitate their operations by limiting the policy space of 
host countries. 
These tensions create dilemmas for policy-makers, who 
typically need to consider various (often conflicting) 
objectives and need to do that in the context of conflicting 
pressures from various stakeholder groups. Among the latter, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have become 
important actors in a number of countries, and their views 
need to be taken into account. These dilemmas and pressures 
impose limitations on the formulation of national laws and 
regulations and entering into IIAs, primarily BITs and free 
trade agreements (FTAs) containing investment chapters. 
(IIAs also include certain World Trade Organization [WTO] 
agreements, notably the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services [GATS] and the Agreement on TRIMs.) Underlying 






6by relaxing performance and approval requirements and 
simplifying business registration. They marketed their 
countries to investors. They offered incentives to attract 
FDI, with incentives competition becoming fiscal wars at the 
sub-national level in some countries. They assisted incoming 
investors in various ways, including by offering information, 
coordinating investor visits, and providing after-investment 
services. They liberalised the repatriation of earnings 
and other capital. And they codified various protections 
in national regulations, laws, or even constitutions. In 
the 1990s, countries also began to establish investment 
promotion agencies with the specific brief to attract as much 
FDI as possible. Red carpet had replaced red tape.
Since the turn of this century, however, national approaches 
in both developed countries and emerging markets towards 
incoming FDI have become more nuanced. While the 
majority of policy changes continue to go in the direction of 
making the investment climate more welcoming, the number 
of changes that do the opposite has risen considerably since 
2000, reaching between 20 and 30 percent of total national 
investment policy changes during the past few years (Figure 
1). Many of the latter measures related to the entry of foreign 
investors and many were concentrated in natural resources 
(including agriculture) and the services sector. A number 
of governments also have come to treat M&As differently 
from greenfield investments. While the latter are universally 
welcome (creating, as they do, new production capacity), 
M&As are at times regarded with suspicion, especially when 
they raise competition concerns, take place in sensitive 
industries (however defined), are being undertaken by state-
controlled entities and, in particular, are seen as a threat to 
national security (however defined). This is reflected in the 
strengthening of the investment review mechanisms in such 
countries as Australia, Canada, China, Germany, and the 
United States (US).
advance their countries’ economic growth and development, 
while for firms FDI is a tool to further their corporate 
competitiveness and profitability. The task of policy-makers 
is to maximise the positive effects of FDI in their countries 
and minimise any negative ones. Hence, national policies 
regarding FDI, and the international regulatory framework 
within which national policies are formulated, are of 
key importance for host countries, and they can conflict 
with the goals of MNEs to maximise their international 
competitiveness and global profits.
TRENDS 
The national regulatory framework for FDI defines whether 
and under what conditions such investment can enter a 
host country, operate in it, and exit it. It is therefore of 
central importance to both host countries seeking to attract 
FDI and benefit from it, and to MNEs seeking to establish a 
portfolio of locational assets that serves their international 
competitiveness best.
Over time, national FDI frameworks have changed 
considerably. After not being welcoming to foreign investors 
during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s (frequently 
enforced through national screening agencies), they turned 
decisively welcoming during the 1990s. During that decade, 
some 95 percent of national FDI policy changes that the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) recorded worldwide went in the direction of 
making the investment climate more favourable for foreign 
investors. Governments opened formerly restricted sectors 
to FDI, removed caps on investments, or raised ceilings for 
such investment. They facilitated the operations of MNEs 
and their foreign affiliates in host countries, including 
FIGURE 1:
Changes in National Investment Policies, 2000–2014 
(Percentages)





















































































7The challenge for national FDI policy makers is to find the 
right balance among policies to attract FDI, seeking to 
increase its benefits to their economies, and regulating 
FDI inflows in pursuit of legitimate national public policy 
objectives (especially the protection of national security) 
without compromising the investment climate and deterring 
foreign investors; policy benchmarking can play a role here. 
Achieving this balance is made more difficult by pressures 
from various constituencies, including constituencies that 
may favour policies that could lead to FDI protectionism, 
and because national policy objectives can change over time. 
National FDI policy-making is a dynamic process.
The approach towards investment promotion has become 
more nuanced as well. To be sure, the overwhelming 
majority of governments still seek to attract as much FDI as 
possible by making their countries’ investment climate more 
welcoming. But a growing number of investment promotion 
agencies also pursue a more targeted approach, focussing 
on attracting the kind of FDI that is particularly important 
for their economies’ economic growth and development. 
There are even signs that countries seek sustainable FDI: 
commercially viable investment that makes a maximum 
contribution to the economic, social, and environmental 
development of host countries and takes place in the 
context of fair governance mechanisms, as concretised by 
host countries and reflected in the incentives they may 
offer– sustainable FDI for sustainable development. In this 
case, the focus is not on the quantity but the quality of FDI. 
Efforts to increase the contribution of FDI to host economies 
are in line with this type of approach, through, for instance, 
the promotion of backward and forward linkages with local 
companies and the encouragement of technology transfer.
However, the incentives competition to attract FDI has 
not abated, be it through financial, fiscal, regulatory, or 
other incentives. This is so despite mounting evidence 
that many incentives are icing on the cake, that is, they do 
not decisively influence the locational decisions of firms 
in most cases. But without a multilateral approach to such 
competition, it is not likely that the incentives competition 
for FDI (not even its transparency) can be contained—a 
future area for international action. Perhaps this could 
be done best in the context of an updated Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM).
Moreover, there are signs that the incentives competition is 
being extended to outward FDI, as governments seek to help 
their firms strengthen their international competitiveness. 
All developed countries, in varying degrees, have put 
instruments (home country measures) in place to help their 
firms invest abroad. Governments provide information about 
investment opportunities and the FDI regulatory framework 
in host countries to their MNEs. They offer financial and 
fiscal incentives for outward FDI. They have established 
institutions to provide investment insurance against various 
political risks. They link official development assistance to 
particular FDI projects (for example, in natural resources). 
And they conclude international investment agreements 
and double taxation treaties to protect investors abroad 
and facilitate their operations. A few emerging markets, too, 
have begun to support their firms investing abroad (the best 
known example being China’s “going global” policy), but the 
great majority of them have not yet done so.
TWO CHALLENGES 
This situation gives rise to two challenges—should there be a 
separate regime for SOEs? And what should countries do that 
do not have a policy on outward FDI? 
The first challenge concerns that state-controlled entities 
(especially SOEs, but also sovereign wealth funds) are among 
the outward investors that benefit from home country 
measures when they invest abroad. SOEs have long been 
outward investors. The assets controlled by the largest 
SOEs that were MNEs and were headquartered in developed 
countries amounted (in 2010) to US$1,400 billion, and those 
controlled by the largest SOEs that were MNEs and were 
headquartered in emerging markets amounted to US$400 
billion. 
Still, the rise of emerging market MNEs that are SOEs 
investing abroad has raised a question, namely whether 
the help given to SOEs investing abroad infringes on 
“competitive neutrality,” that is, distorts the competitive 
outward FDI landscape in favour of these entities in the 
markets in which they invest. For instance, SOEs seeking 
to acquire firms in host countries may have a competitive 
advantage when receiving concessional financing by their 
home country governments. (There is also the question 
of whether such entities might be pursuing objectives 
other than commercial ones.) This issue is currently being 
negotiated in the context of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) agreement, and it is also on the agenda for the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). 
The result may be a special regime for a certain class of 
investors. This, in turn, raises the question of whether it 
is desirable to move away from a unified international 
investment law and policy regime and towards a regime 
that distinguishes types of investors and, for that matter, 
types of investments (for example, M&As versus greenfield 
investment). It also raises the question of whether the 
application of the principle of competitive neutrality should 
remain limited to state-controlled entities or should be 
extended to the support, through various incentives, of 
outward FDI in general, be it by state-controlled entities or 
private firms. (In this context, it needs to be recognised that 
state ownership does not necessarily always mean state 
control and, conversely, not having state ownership does 
not always mean that the government cannot influence 
corporate decision-making.) This question mirrors the 
discussion of whether incentives offered by countries to 
attract FDI need to be disciplined, an issue that had already 
been (unsuccessfully) raised in the context of the Uruguay 
8OBJECTIVES AND CHARACTERISTICS
The objectives that governments pursue when establishing 
national regulatory frameworks for FDI influence the 
objectives they pursue when concluding international 
investment agreements—the latter need to support national 
objectives, or, at least, not stymie them. The importance 
of the international law and policy regime as a parameter—
and legal yardstick—for national law and policy-making has 
risen considerably, as this regime has “teeth,” in the form of 
an international dispute settlement mechanism that allows 
investors to seek redress in case they feel that host countries 
have violated their rights. Awards against governments can 
potentially be high, not counting the costs of arbitration 
and possible implications for the regulatory power of 
governments.
Thus, in the 1990s, when the predominant national 
objective of governments was to attract FDI during the 
heyday of liberalisation and make the investment climate 
more welcoming for foreign investors, the number of BITs 
concluded by governments exploded from 371 at the end of 
the 1980s to 1,862 at the end of the 1990s, to reach 2,923 
at the end of 2014, to which 345 other IIAs need to be 
added. Protecting FDI through BITs was meant to encourage 
investment inflows.
Indeed, the principal purpose of these treaties was—and 
remains—to protect the assets of investors abroad and 
facilitate the operations of these investors in host countries. 
This did not happen by accident, but rather by design—when 
developed countries began to negotiate BITs with developing 
countries in 1959, the clear objective was to protect FDI in a 
world in which, on the one hand, foreign investors had little 
confidence in the judicial systems of developing countries, 
and, on the other hand, international investment law 
consisted largely of relatively vague customary international 
law which, moreover, was questioned by many developing 
countries. In later years, a growing number of countries 
added liberalisation provisions to their IIAs to make it easier 
for their firms to enter foreign markets and operate in them, 
especially by stipulating national treatment at the pre-
establishment phase of an investment. Now, a sizable share 
of IIAs (and especially BITs) also exists between emerging 
markets.
 
During the 2000s, when the national regulatory frameworks 
for FDI in a number of countries became more nuanced, 
the content of the IIAs of these countries (for example, 
the US) became more nuanced as well, for instance, by 
limiting certain protections and clarifying their meaning or 
dropping them altogether. But, overwhelmingly, the current 
international investment law and policy regime remains 
characterised by the clear objective to protect foreign 
investment and facilitate the operations of foreign investors 
in host countries. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, key concepts in IIAs and the 
protections enshrined in them are very broad, not clearly 
defined, and subject to evolution. To begin with, “investors” 
are defined as any individuals and legal persons having 
any kind of assets abroad (at the same time, though, it is, 
for instance, not clear, who precisely is entitled to claims, 






Round. While a multilateral agreement limiting incentives 
competition—be it for inward or outward FDI—may be 
desirable, it is difficult to achieve. 
This leads immediately to the second challenge—what 
should (the majority of) emerging markets do that have 
not put a helpful framework for their own foreign investors 
in place? If they do not establish such a framework, their 
own firms venturing abroad are placed at a competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis their competitors headquartered in 
countries that can benefit from an array of home country 
measures. Given that, as of 2013, firms in 138 emerging 
markets had reported outward FDI, and more are likely to 
move into that category of countries, the question of an 
appropriate outward FDI policy is likely to become the new 
frontier of national FDI policy-making—with international 
competition to support outward investment intensifying. 
This, in turn, may also raise new policy issues. For example, it 
may lead to “home country measures shopping”—when firms 
have an option on from where to invest in a third country, 
they may invest from a country that offers particularly 
favourable home country measures to firms investing abroad 
from its territory.
The ultimate policy objective of both host and home 
countries is to maximise the benefits of FDI and limit any 
potential negative effects. As noted, national regulatory 
frameworks for FDI are becoming more nuanced. 
Governments are becoming increasingly interested in the 
type of an investment, the source of an investment, and the 
effects of an investment in their countries. Achieving the 
right balance has become a key challenge for countries, and 
it is one that emerging markets, especially with regard to 
outward FDI by their firms, increasingly need to consider. 
9in turn and as a rule, include (in an open-ended manner) 
everything that has a monetary value, ranging from equity 
in an enterprise, to intellectual property rights, to contracts, 
to expected profits. Similarly, key protection standards to 
be observed by host countries, such as fair and equitable 
treatment (which has become the basis of many claims 
by investors) and indirect expropriation, are not defined 
precisely. Protection, further, is expanded through most-
favoured nation (MFN) commitments, umbrella clauses, 
and the possibility of treaty shopping. At the same time, 
IIAs do not impose obligations on foreign investors or, as a 
rule, on home countries. And they typically do not pay much 
attention to some other public policy objectives, such as 
economic development. 
Matters are further complicated because the international 
investment law regime consists of a multiplicity of legal 
sources. These include the multitude of IIAs, customary 
international law, the decisions of tribunals, various voluntary 
governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental 
standards, as well as mixed voluntary/mandatory 
instruments. While there are many substantive similarities 
among many of these instruments, there are also substantial 
differences. The regime governing international investment 
is therefore highly fragmented, difficult to describe, and 
hard to navigate, and it exhibits instances of inconsistent 
law making and law application. Moreover, it is in constant 
flux. Its fragmented institutional infrastructure further 
exacerbates these challenges.
Finally, a defining and crucial characteristic of the investment 
regime is that investors have a private right to action when 
seeking redress, under the investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) mechanism enshrined in the majority of IIAs. From 
the perspective of international investors, this is a strong 
and positive feature of the investment regime, because 
governments do at times infringe on treaty obligations, and 
investors can therefore have real and legitimate grievances 
about the behaviour of host country governments. In such 
cases, ISDS makes investors independent of their home 
country governments when they wish to bring a claim (unlike 
in the case of the WTO). It also makes them independent 
of the judicial systems of their host countries, a number 
of which, for various reasons, investors may not trust or 
favour fully. The ISDS mechanism makes the international 
investment regime one of the strongest international 
regimes in existence.
CHALLENGE OF PREVENTING, MANAGING AND 
SETTLING DISPUTES
Rise of disputes and criticisms of their settlement 
While the current ISDS mechanism may work well from 
the perspective of international investors, it entails 
considerable risks for host country governments. These 
begin with that, under applicable IIAs, aggrieved investors 
have a choice between seeking remedy either under the 
domestic law of a host country or the applicable IIA (or 
both), while host countries do not have that choice, as 
only investors can initiate the ISDS mechanism when 
disputes between investors and host countries arise. (There 
is also the question of whether contractual claims can be 
pursued parallel to treaty claims.) And such disputes are 
unavoidable, considering the growth of inward FDI (now 
amounting to a stock of some US$26 trillion); the number of 
international investors; the number of their foreign affiliates 
and the number of investors in such affiliates (all of which, 
depending on the applicable IIA, may have a right to initiate 
arbitration proceedings); the intrusiveness of FDI, involving, 
as it does, the entire range of interactions related to the 
production process over the entire life span of a project; 
and the various tensions within which national policy-
making in this area is situated. Add to that the number of 
IIAs; the broad definitions of “investor” and “investment;” 
the broad formulation of the various protections contained 
in these agreements; and that violations of investor rights 
can take place at any administrative level (that is, not only 
the national level). As a result, the potential for conflicts 
between host countries and MNEs and their foreign affiliates 
is considerable—it is not even possible to estimate the 
potential liabilities to which governments are exposed. 
Not surprisingly, then, the number of treaty-based 
investment disputes has risen considerably, having reached 
at least 608 known cases by the end of 2014 (Figure 2), 
involving governments of 99 countries from across the world. 
(While this number of disputes may appear low, it should be 
compared to the number of disputes on which panel reports 
were issued during the existence of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] from 1948 to the end of 1994—
when the WTO came into existence—which was only 91.) As 
disputes are resolved in favour of investors (although many 
are not), more claims are likely to be brought, especially 
if third-party financing becomes more widely available. 
Moreover, awards against responding host countries can 
be high, as can be the costs of arbitration (the costs of the 
claimant’s defence alone can often be in the millions of US 
dollars).
As a result, no aspect of the international investment 
regime is more in the public’s eye than the regime’s dispute 
settlement mechanism. Critics submit, rightly or wrongly 
and among other things, that, de facto, big investors only 
have access to the dispute settlement mechanism, while 
governments do not (except in the case of counter-claims); 
that small and medium-size enterprises cannot afford the 
ISDS process; that private arbitral panels adjudicate over 
public policies; that conflicts of interests exist for arbitrators, 
including conflicts of interests that may compromise their 
independence; that inconsistent decisions are rendered; that 
there is no real possibility for the review of arbitral decisions 
taken; that poor countries are not in a position to defend 
themselves as respondents; that the decisions of tribunals 
may chill policy-making in such areas as the protection 
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of the environment, the observance of social standards, 
the protection of human rights, and the advancement 
of development; that investors engage in abusive treaty 
shopping to benefit from ISDS; that they bring frivolous suits; 
that governments can never win in arbitrations, but only not 
lose; and that the costs of the rising number of claims are 
high, both in terms of the costs of the arbitration process 
and the potential awards involved. Some of these criticisms 
are overstated, some are more serious than others, some are 
being addressed in more recent IIAs, but all of them bear—
rightly or wrongly—on the legitimacy of the ISDS mechanism 
and, with that, on the legitimacy of the international 
investment regime.
Key questions therefore are—how can investment disputes 
be prevented in the first instance, that is, at the national 
level? And, in particular, how can the handling of disputes at 
the international level be improved? 
Meeting the challenge at the national level
At the national level, the prevention, management, and 
resolution of disputes between foreign investors and host 
countries are imperative. In particular, it is imperative for 
countries to avoid such disputes reaching the international 
(arbitration) level. Institutions such as investment 
ombudspersons and inter-ministerial committees (as, for 
example, in Peru) that vet conflicts that arise, with a view 
towards settling them amicably at an early stage, are 
helpful here. So, too, are such alternative dispute resolution 
approaches such as mediation.
Moreover, possibilities to reduce the likelihood that 
large contracts between international investors and host 
countries become a source of disputes could be explored. 
Often, such contracts do not reflect the best possible deal 
a host country could obtain had it (like the negotiating 
international investor) a multi-disciplinary world-class team 
negotiating on its behalf. Contracts that are, or are seen to 
be, unbalanced are likely not to last. Rather, they are likely to 
give rise to conflicts that, ultimately, may go to international 
arbitration. Fair deals also benefit investors in that they 
create conditions of mutual trust and help the sustainability 
of commitments. (In the past, it might have been possible 
to improve bad deals over time; but with the advent of the 
increasing use of ISDS, countries need to get deals right from 
the beginning.) 
One possible response to this situation is the creation of an 
investment negotiations support facility. Such a facility could 
help especially the 48 least developed countries negotiate 
fair large-scale investment contracts with foreign investors. 
It is promising that the Group of Seven (G7) (with the 
encouragement of the least developed countries) has begun 
to look into the possibility of establishing such a facility, as 
fair contracts would reduce at least one source of potential 
conflicts between international investors and host country 
governments.
Meeting the challenge at the international level
As to international dispute settlement, a number of options 
should be considered to improve the ISDS mechanism, at 
least going forward, and a number of them have already 
been addressed in, for instance, more recent treaties of the 
US. Some of these should be relatively straightforward. For 
instance, abusive treaty shopping to obtain the protection 
of an IIA and its ISDS mechanism could be limited sharply by 
requiring that a substantial presence test be met. Similarly, 
frivolous claims could be avoided through a screening 
mechanism that allows the dismissal of such claims. 
Transparency has been significantly strengthened. A code of 
FIGURE 2:
Known Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases, 1987–2014






















































































































































ethics for arbitrators could help to avoid conflicts of interest. 
Arbitral proceedings could be opened up to the submission 
of amicus briefs and the attendance of non-parties in 
arbitral hearings. The establishment of standing panels of 
arbitrators could help alleviate concerns about the selection 
of arbitrators, their independence, and their impartiality 
(although, given that two of the arbitrators are appointed by 
the parties to a dispute, it is difficult to see how they could 
be seen as being independent and impartial). Treaty parties 
could be given greater rights in the interpretation of their 
treaties, both in general and in the context of an ongoing 
dispute, which are binding for arbitrators. Treaties could 
make it explicit that governments have the right to regulate 
in the public interest, even if that imposes burdens on foreign 
investors. And so on.
There are also more fundamental improvements that could 
be envisaged. They need to be based on the recognition 
that the current approach to dispute settlement by arbitral 
tribunals involves a fundamental tension. On the one hand, 
it is a party-owned process undertaken in an ad-hoc manner 
by private individuals focused on solving individual disputes; 
on the other hand, these private individuals exercise quasi 
public law functions in that arbitrators review the legality of 
certain actions by governments and, broader, contribute to 
the further development of international investment law, but 
with weak democratic legitimisation, legislative control, and 
the ability to appeal decisions to correct judicial errors and 
ensure consistency. 
In this context, a topical and urgent question is whether 
appeals mechanisms for the current ad-hoc tribunals, a world 
investment court as a standing first-instance tribunal making 
the decision in any dispute settlement case, or a combination 
of both should be established. Institutionalising dispute 
settlement in this manner would be a major step towards 
improving the investment regime, comparable to the move 
from the ad-hoc dispute settlement process in the GATT to 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding in the WTO. Such an 
institutional innovation could not insure the full consistency 
of the application of IIAs, given that the underlying treaties 
are not uniform. However, it could, over time, make the 
dispute settlement process more accountable and develop 
a body of legal authoritative interpretations that would 
increase the coherence and predictability of the investment 
regime. More generally, creating an avenue for appeal would 
increase the legitimacy of a central component of that 
regime and enhance the rule of law.
Several configurations and arrangements are conceivable. 
For example, awards issued by the ad-hoc panels currently 
envisaged in IIAs could be appealed to ad-hoc appellate 
bodies. These could be constituted in the context of 
particular disputes and in a manner similar to the way in 
which the first-level ad-hoc panels were established, but 
with a broader mandate than that of the ad-hoc annulment 
committees of the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) (which are empowered 
to annul only on the specific grounds of Article 52 of the 
ICSID Convention). In a variation, the members of the 
appellate bodies could be chosen from a predetermined 
list of persons, preferably not by the parties to a dispute 
but by an independent third party. In either case, appeals 
could proceed under whatever arbitration rules have been 
chosen. One advantage of such an approach would be that 
appeals mechanisms could relatively easily be added to 
the current ad-hoc regime. A disadvantage is that such an 
approach would not necessarily increase the consistency and 
predictability of arbitral decisions, although, if arbitrators 
were to be chosen from a relatively limited pool, consistency 
could increase.
On the other end of the spectrum, one could envisage a 
single permanent and independent world investment court, 
staffed by tenured impartial judges. It would serve as the first 
instance for any dispute, replacing the current decentralised 
dispute settlement regime. It could be supplemented, 
in due course, with a standing appellate body. Decisions 
rendered by any of these bodies would be precedential. 
One advantage of such an approach would be that it would 
increase the consistency and predictability of decisions and 
in this manner help consolidate international investment 
law. A disadvantage is that such an approach would 
establish a relatively elaborate—and ambitious—structure 
in a specialised field of international economic law. It would 
resemble a national court system.
There are of course variations between these two approaches. 
(And there are also options outside these two approaches, 
such as requiring the [time-limited?] exhaustion of local 
remedies and abandoning ISDS altogether [or at least in 
certain contexts], or expanding access to this mechanism 
to indigenous firms.) For instance, one could imagine an 
appellate mechanism for reviewing awards being established 
in the framework of the treaty negotiations between two or 
more parties, but other states would be invited to opt in to 
make use of that mechanism as well, multilateralising the 
appellate mechanism in this manner (this approach seems 
to be foreseen in the TPP Agreement). Other variations are 
conceivable. Any new arrangement could, in principle, be 
made applicable to the stock of IIAs by taking a Mauritius 
Convention-type approach—governments could negotiate a 
convention on the applicability of an appellate mechanism 
in existing IIAs, making the agreed-upon applicability binding 
for them and their treaty partners, provided the latter have 
signed and ratified the convention as well.
While ambitious, it is not inconceivable that institutional 
improvements in the investment regime’s dispute settlement 
system can be made. After all, the IIAs concluded by the 
US in the past decade or so foresee the possibility of an 
appellate body. The European Union (EU), in agreements 
with Canada and Singapore, is warming to this proposal, 
as reflected in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement and the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement. 
Moreover, the EU is under pressure to improve the ISDS 
mechanism substantially. Importantly, it has responded 
to this pressure by announcing in May 2015 that it seeks 
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to introduce an appeals mechanism in its IIAs, in a move 
towards a dispute settlement approach that would function 
similar to traditional court systems. Beyond that, the EU is 
also working towards the establishment of an international 
investment court and appellate mechanism that would 
apply to multiple agreements, and which would be a 
stepping stone towards a permanent multilateral system for 
investment disputes. 
Any of these institutional improvements would of course 
involve significant challenges, requiring substantial research, 
multi-stakeholder consultations, and extensive negotiations. 
Issues that would need to be considered include the 
following. What can one learn from the experience of similar 
arrangements in other areas, especially trade? Would the 
benefits of such an institutional change outweigh its costs 
(including the possibility that unfortunate decisions might 
set bad precedents, or that the process might become too 
costly for smaller investors)? What would the architecture 
of such an institution look like and how would such an 
institution be organised? How would such an institution be 
created? How would appointments be made? How would 
it be financed? How would such an institutional innovation 
be made applicable to disputes arising under existing 
IIAs? And should such an institution be a standalone body 
or be associated with an existing institution (and, if so, 
which)? For example—and just to mention one possibility 
in relation to the last of these questions—since the ICSID is 
the single most prominent dispute settlement venue, one 
could think of a treaty updating the present Convention—
an ICSID II, so to speak. It would preserve enforceability 
but update any features in the current rules that might 
require modernisation. (including, for example, expanding 
the possibility for counter-claims). Most importantly, such 
a new treaty would create a single world investment court 
(and appellate body) that would then be available to all 
governments that have signed and ratified such a treaty. 
Difficult as it is to improve the current dispute settlement 
mechanism, embarking on a process of examining how 
this could be done, with a view towards bringing a better 
mechanism into being, would send a strong signal that 
governments recognise that the ISDS mechanism would 
benefit from improvement. This is not merely a technical 
question but (as public discussions of ISDS show) a matter of 
what is considered as fair by the public.
Detailed discussions of the range of issues related to this 
matter are already under way in a number of forums. These 
should make sure that all interested stakeholders are heard, 
including to ensure that all issues are being addressed. In-
depth discussions in informal forums could helpfully make an 
input into governmental deliberations.
AN ADVISORY CENTRE ON INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW
A similar signal strengthening the legitimacy of the dispute 
settlement process would be sent if the ability of poor 
countries to defend themselves as respondents in investment 
disputes would be improved. (This matter is dealt with 
separately here, as it is not a matter of access to the dispute 
settlement mechanism, but a matter of being able to utilise 
it properly.) Conversely, a dispute settlement mechanism 
that does not provide a level playing field for the disputing 
parties can easily be seen as compromised, undermining its 
very legitimacy. 
Claims against host country governments can range in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars, host country regulations 
may be challenged and the reputation of a country as an 
investment location can be at stake. And, as noted, the 
annual number of claims is substantial, and litigating them 
is expensive, especially as disputes are becoming more 
complex. There is also the risk that respondents may have 
to assume the litigation costs of the claimants if they lose a 
case. The advent of third-party funding further accentuates 
the imbalance for poor countries, as such funding provides an 
additional source of finance to potential claimants. 
Poor countries typically do not have the in-house expertise 
to defend themselves adequately—in fact it may not be 
the best use of scarce resources to build such expertise 
as few countries need to defend themselves in more than 
one or two cases at a time. At the same time, they often 
do not know how to defend themselves properly and are 
not familiar with the specific requirements of the ISDS 
mechanism. And many simply may not have the financial 
resources to hire the required expertise, which also does not 
help the efficiency and quality of the arbitration process—an 
important consideration since the bulk of the litigation costs 
typically are for counsel and expert witnesses. 
This puts poor countries into an unfavourable position 
whenever a dispute arises, beginning with perhaps having to 
settle a dispute in which they potentially could prevail, or 
knowing when to settle during an early stage of a dispute 
when they usefully could do so, simply because they do 
not have the required understanding of the process or the 
resources to defend themselves. Similar considerations apply 
to small and medium-sized enterprises, as these too typically 
do not have the expertise and resources to raise claims; 
a small claims settlement mechanism, with an expedited 
process, set deadlines, and sole arbitrators, could be of help 
here. 
An independent Advisory Centre on International Investment 
Law would help to establish a level playing field by providing 
administrative and legal assistance to respondents that 
face investor claims and are themselves not in a position 
to defend themselves adequately. The WTO experience 
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provides useful inspiration. When, after the creation of the 
WTO, the number of disputes brought in this institution 
rose, the (independent) Advisory Centre on WTO Law 
was established in 2001—the principal outcome of the 
tumultuous Seattle WTO Ministerial Meeting. It advises its 
developing country members on all issues relating to WTO 
law, including by assisting its members in all stages of the 
organisation’s regular panel and Appellate Body proceedings 
as complainants, respondents, and third parties. The WTO 
Advisory Centre provides its services through its own staff or 
through outside counsel at reduced rates.
 
Establishing such a Centre would require answers to a 
number of questions. For example, which countries should 
be able to benefit from its services—all emerging markets 
or only the least developed countries? Should its mandate 
include supporting respondents in dispute settlement 
proceedings or only supporting and advising on international 
investment law and dispute settlement procedures? Should 
it provide technical assistance to governments, for example, 
capacity building through legal training in matters related 
to ISDS or, broader, the negotiation of IIAs with dispute 
settlement provisions? Should it advise on the compatibility 
of national laws and regulations (proposed or in place) 
with the IIAs a country has signed, including the rights and 
obligations arising from such IIAs? At what price should its 
services be made available? How would costs be covered? 
Such assistance could also involve advice as to whether a 
claim is strong and the government should therefore settle. 
There are more questions that need to be considered. The 
central challenge is to ensure that all countries have a fair 
chance to defend themselves adequately in disputes to 
which they are a party. 
The WTO Advisory Centre has done valuable work, 
contributing its share to enhancing the legitimacy of 
the international trading system. An Advisory Centre on 
International Investment Law—which would suitably 
complement a reform of the ISDS mechanism—could do the 
same thing for the international investment regime. It should 
be established as soon as possible.
The questions just raised, as well as others, could be pursued 
in an exploratory working group consisting of representatives 
from principal stakeholders. It could be serviced by an NGO 
with a track record of work on the international trading 
system. It could, hopefully, also draw on the experience 
of intergovernmental organisations with an interest in 
this subject. It would be desirable if a few governments 
particularly concerned about the legitimacy of the 
international investment regime would assume a lead role to 
move such an initiative forward.  
UPDATING THE CONTENTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: REFINING KEY 
CONCEPTS, BROADENING THE PURPOSE OF THE 
REGIME, AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF INVESTORS 
In the end, however, there are limitations to what even an 
improved dispute settlement mechanism can do. The reason 
is that any such mechanism needs to operate on the basis of 
applicable IIAs. If these agreements contain language that 
refers to general principles and rules that are open textured, 
imprecise, and leave considerable room for interpretation, 
then the possibility that disputes arise is commensurately 
high, as is the unpredictability for governments as to what 
they can or cannot do. Legal certainty is required, even if it 
may be impossible—and perhaps not even desirable—to 
eliminate all room for interpretation. 
Accordingly, an important aspect of improving the regime 
concerns refining the key concepts in IIAs, including their 
substantive protections, by providing tight wording that 
defines as clearly as possible the sort of injuries for which 
investors can seek compensation and the type of actions 
that governments can take. Given that the post-2015 
international agenda is shaped by sustainable development 
considerations, it would also be desirable to develop 
actionable criteria for what constitutes sustainable FDI 
(as defined earlier), for example, by elaborating a list of 
attributes that could be used to evaluate the nature of 
an investment in a particular investor-state dispute (for 
example, paying taxes in host countries? Training? Fostering 
linkages?). 
A related issue concerns the interrelationships of the 
international investment regime with other substantive areas 
of the law, including the international regimes dealing with 
the environment, human rights, labour, and development, 
as well as taxation and subsidies. After all, the investment 
regime is not a closed law system that stands in isolation 
from other international regimes. Guidance on how such 
linkages should be recognised could be built into IIAs, 
for instance, through a general provision referring to the 
relevance of other areas of international law. 
In other words, governments need to take full responsibility 
for the drafting of IIAs by seeking to reach the highest 
level of clarity possible for concepts used by them and 
interrelationships that need to be taken into account. 
While providing greater clarity and recognising 
interrelationships should, in principle, be possible going 
forward, there is also the challenge of how to deal with 
the stock of IIAs in this respect. The Mauritius Convention 
on Transparency (opened for signature in March 2015) 
provides one approach towards how that challenge could 
be addressed—governments could negotiate a convention 
on, say, the precise meaning of fair and equitable treatment, 
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and states could sign up to it, making the agreed-upon 
interpretation binding for them and their treaty partners, 
provided the latter have signed and ratified the convention 
as well. (It may be difficult to follow this approach for 
only one standard, as the scope of a given standard can be 
connected with the scope of other standards; where this is 
the case, several standards would have to be covered in 
such a convention—which would make such an effort more 
complicated.)
These challenges, in turn, are directly related to the principal 
purpose of the investment regime. Given the origin of IIAs, 
it is not surprising (as pointed out earlier) that the principal 
purpose of the regime has been, and remains, to protect 
foreign investors and, increasingly, facilitate their operations. 
The question is whether such a narrow focus, reflecting the 
interests of one stakeholder only, is sustainable. The growing 
criticism of the regime suggests otherwise, as does the fact 
that a number of governments have pulled out of the regime. 
In particular, the quest of governments to be able to pursue 
legitimate public policy objectives without risking that they 
might be seen to violate investors’ rights highlights that a 
new balance is required. The same applies to the continuing 
demand that foreign investors, like domestic investors, have 
responsibilities too, and not only host countries. Unless the 
regime can be made more holistic, reflecting in a balanced 
manner the interests of all principal stakeholders and 
defining the relationships between foreign investors and 
governments in general, it risks losing its legitimacy in the 
longer run. 
Enhancing the legitimacy of the regime requires therefore 
that the regime’s purpose be broadened to reflect not only 
the desire of countries to protect the assets of international 
investors, but also the interest of countries in pursuing 
other legitimate public policy objectives. The latter include 
in particular the need to promote sustainable development 
(and, with it, the flow of investment for sustainable 
development). This, in turn, requires that governments 
have the right to regulate in the interest of legitimate public 
policy objectives, and this right needs to be acknowledged 
in a legal provision in IIAs. These objectives include not 
only the promotion of sustainable development, but also 
the protection of public welfare, including public health, 
labour standards, safety, and the environment. This, in turn, 
necessitates governments to have a certain amount of policy 
space and investors to commit themselves to responsible 
business conduct. 
When it comes to substantive provisions flowing from the 
broadened objectives of IIAs, then, these would not only 
have to confer rights on investors and responsibilities on 
host countries. Rather, they would also have to recognise 
the rights of host countries to pursue legitimate public policy 
objectives and deal with the responsibilities of investors. In 
addition, the rights and responsibilities of home countries—
and, for that matter, other stakeholders—would have to be 
considered.
 
“Policy space” is a flexible concept, and care needs to be 
taken that it is not interpreted too broadly. This is similar 
to the challenge (discussed earlier) of taking care that 
key concepts and protections contained in IIAs are not 
interpreted too broadly. In either case, the possibility that 
this may occur reduces predictability, be it for investors or 
governments, and it increases the likelihood that investor-
state conflicts occur. Hence, clearer wording for key concepts 
and protections in IIAs needs to be sought. 
It is encouraging to see that the investment regime is 
already moving in the direction of broadened objectives and 
updated contents of IIAs, even if not as fast as some would 
desire. But, then, reform has to be balanced with the need 
to maintain the predictability of the regime as a protection 
device, and it has to build on what is working.
As far as objectives are concerned, more and more IIAs 
recognise, in their preambles, objectives other than 
protection, as well as the right to regulate. Particular 
attention is being given to public health, labour standards, 
safety, and the environment.
As to the contents of IIAs, some governments have narrowed 
the definition of “investment” by clarifying its scope. They 
have also clarified certain protections and, in the process, 
narrowed them somewhat (for example, fair and equitable 
treatment, indirect expropriation). They have dropped some 
protections entirely (for example, the umbrella clause). They 
have provided for consultations between the parties about 
the promotion of investment and other issues. And they are 
giving a greater role to treaty partners regarding the joint 
interpretation of clauses they have negotiated, giving them 
in this manner more control over their agreements (including, 
conceivably, the power to suspend arbitral proceedings if 
they agree that there is no treaty violation). 
There is also movement regarding the question of the 
responsibilities of investors, in the interest of promoting 
desirable corporate conduct and discourage undesirable 
one. To begin with, host country governments can of 
course impose obligations on investors (both, domestic and 
foreign), and have done so, and investors have to abide by 
them, making them liable for any infringements that might 
occur. But there is the question of the extent to which IIAs 
limit the ability of host countries to do so, or discourage 
them to do so, for fear of being accused of violating treaty 
provisions. The introduction of investor responsibilities in 
IIAs would remedy this situation. Moreover, for countries 
with limited capabilities to enact their own laws and 
regulations in this area—and, equally important, implement 
them—the inclusion of investor responsibilities in IIAs would 
compensate for this lack of capability.1 There is indeed some 
movement regarding including relevant responsibility clauses 
in IIAs and, separately and complementarily, strengthening 
Including investor responsibilities in IIAs can also serve another function, 
namely, depending on circumstances, as a shield against investor claims.
1
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and developing various voluntary instruments that operate 
largely on the basis of naming and shaming. 
For instance, the recent Netherlands-United Arab Emirates 
BIT, for instance, enjoins the parties to promote the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Technically, there 
are also stronger ways of addressing obligations of investors. 
For example, the availability of investor protections could be 
conditioned on compliance with the applicable laws when 
making an investment, including anti-corruption laws, as 
the recently concluded Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) does. Compliance with domestic laws and 
the observation of responsible business conduct during the 
operations of the investment could become a prerequisite 
for access to dispute settlement. A doctrine of “reasonable 
expectations” on the part of governments vis-à-vis foreign 
investors could be developed, for instance in the context 
of interpreting any of the current substantive obligations 
(say whether the host country’s has indeed been fair and 
equitable) or in the context of obligations of investors, as a 
balance in determining fair and equitable treatment (based 
on the view that fair and equitable is a relational issue seeing 
fairness and equity as a two-way street). Investors could be 
held liable for the non-observance of certain domestic laws 
of their host countries through counterclaims in the ISDS 
process. They could also be held liable for complicity or 
direct acts connected to the non-observance of obligations 
contained in international treaties pertaining to, for example, 
human rights and labour issues, that IIA treaty partners 
have ratified; while such treaties normally do not impose 
obligations directly on investors, IIAs could make reference 
to such treaties through an “import clause” and establish 
a link to investors. Or investors could be held liable for the 
non-observance of certain voluntary international standards, 
subject to certain conditions and exceptions. Ensuring that 
investors can be subject to a proper hearing on the merits 
in their ultimate home country for damages caused by their 
investments in host countries could also improve investor 
conduct vis-a-vis their foreign operations. All these are 
avenues for addressing the responsibilities of investors in 
IIAs that, technically, could be pursued. It is another matter, 
however, to what extent any of them would be able to garner 
the support of treaty partners.
As to voluntary instruments, the 1976 OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises are an example of how a voluntary 
set of guidelines can be strengthened. More specifically, 
by establishing an implementation mechanism, reviewing 
the guidelines from time to time (and adding provisions 
covering new subjects), empowering a committee to issue 
clarifications, and providing key constituencies with access 
to the implementation mechanism, the guidelines were 
strengthened over time and have become more effective. In 
2011, the United Nations’ Human Rights Council adopted the 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, followed 
three years later by a voted decision to establish an open-
ended intergovernmental working group to elaborate an 
international legally binding instrument to regulate the 
activities of MNEs and other business enterprises. 
While the guiding principles are voluntary (relying on non-
binding multi-stakeholder approach for its implementation), 
the evolution of the OECD Guidelines and the Netherlands-
United Arab Emirates BIT show that voluntary instruments 
can be “hardened.” Since many instruments providing 
guidance to MNEs and other business enterprises are 
voluntary, the question arises whether it would be 
worthwhile to explore how a hardening of voluntary 
instruments could be achieved over time to reach a certain 
balance in the rights and responsibilities of international 
investors and governments—if not in one instrument, then at 
least across several. 
Either of these two paths towards the greater recognition of 
the responsibilities of investors—including responsibilities in 
IIAs and strengthening voluntary instruments—encounters 
a number of challenges. For one, some (or many) firms are 
likely to resist treaty-based responsibilities of investors; 
others, however, especially those that have already accepted 
various corporate social responsibility standards, may be 
more accommodating. Moreover, imposing direct obligations 
in IIAs on international investors is not without its own 
challenges, as international treaties normally bind states 
only. In addition, there is the question of not discriminating 
between foreign and domestic enterprises, with the former 
being subject to higher standards. (But, then, while foreign 
investors have access to ISDS, domestic ones do not.) At the 
same time, though, is it likely that, say ten years from now, 
it would be acceptable that the investment regime reflects 
primarily the interests of one group of stakeholders and 
that it imposes obligations only on host countries? Or that 
obligations are mandatory for governments and voluntary for 
firms? If this is not likely to be acceptable, it is necessary to 
explore how these issues can be addressed. 
A working group consisting of leading international 
investment scholars could propose how the objectives and 
contents of IIAs could best be updated, in close consultation 
with principal stakeholders. Such a group could benefit 
from the support of a consortium of universities from 
all continents. The results could then be presented to 
governments, for their consideration in future investment 
rule-making. 
A MULTILATERAL/PLURILATERAL FRAMEWORK 
ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
There is also the question whether the ideal approach would 
be to have one instrument that defined the relationships 
between governments and international investors—a 
universal framework on international investment that, in 
a coherent and transparent manner, would provide the 
predictability and stability that long-term investment 
needs. That is, global rules for a global economy, starting 
from the need to promote sustainable development. (See 
in this context UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Framework 
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and the Model International Agreement on Investment for 
Sustainable Development prepared by the International 
Institute on Sustainable Development.) Such a framework, 
be it multilateral or plurilateral, would establish a basic 
set of commitments observed by all signatories, be they 
small or big countries. It would avoid the difficulties that 
arise from a regime that consists of a multitude of IIAs, be 
it for international investors that operate in a multitude of 
jurisdictions (each with its own varying commitments in 
IIAs), or be it for governments that may see some of their 
objectives frustrated by treaty shopping on the part of some 
international investors. Such a framework could also reduce 
the need of negotiating separate agreements that, together 
with the existing agreements, would eventually amount to a 
holistic framework on international investment. 
Naturally, negotiating a universal framework would face a 
range of difficulties, as reflected in the abortive past efforts 
to do so. These difficulties would include reaching, among 
a great number of governments, the right balance of rules 
that various stakeholder groups might wish to obtain, and 
determining where such a framework could be negotiated. 
At the same time, though, governments have shown great 
willingness to make rules on international investment, as 
reflected in the continued proliferation of IIAs. If a truly 
universal framework is considered out of reach at this time 
(including through the expansion of the GATS to cover other 
types of investment), one might want to consider whether 
a plurilateral framework on international investment could 
serve as a first step in that direction. In either case, the 
international investment court and appellate mechanism 
sought by the EU, as a stepping stone towards a permanent 
multilateral system for investment disputes, could become a 
nucleus around which a universal framework could be built.
Moreover, the mega-regionals (all of which are likely to 
contain investment chapters), as well as the BITs between 
important countries that are currently being negotiated, 
could well result in a more harmonised approach and, 
ultimately, facilitate a move towards a universal agreement. 
These negotiations represent significant opportunities to 
shape the investment regime by narrowing the substantive 
and procedural international investment law and policy 
differences between and among the principal FDI host and 
home countries and setting standards that considerably 
influence future investment rule-making in general. If this 
occurs, the result of these negotiations will become stepping 
stones towards a universal investment instrument.
Equally if not more importantly, the constellation of interests 
of countries has changed profoundly and in a manner that 
should help with pursuing a universal approach. When earlier 
efforts at the multilateral level were undertaken, there was a 
clear distinction between home and host countries, typically 
along North-South lines. Now, as documented earlier, firms 
in a rising number of emerging markets (and particularly the 
biggest among them) are becoming important and dynamic 
outward investors. The implication is that emerging markets 
define their policy interests no longer only defensively 
as host countries, but also offensively as home countries 
interested in protecting their investors abroad and facilitating 
their operations. This can be exemplified by China’s change 
in approach when, in the context of the US-China Strategic 
and Economic Dialogue, the country agreed in July 2013 
to continue negotiating a BIT with the US on the basis of 
pre-establishment national treatment and the negative 
list approach to exceptions from such treatment—both 
approaches resisted by China before then. 
Similarly, developed countries have “discovered” that they 
are also important host countries, including for investors 
headquartered in emerging markets, and that they are 
increasingly respondents to international arbitration claims. 
The implication is that they define their policy interest 
no longer only offensively as home countries, but also 
defensively as host countries interested in maintaining 
adequate policy space to be able to pursue legitimate public 
policy objectives. This can be exemplified by the change 
of approach by the US when, in revising its model BIT, it 
narrowed protections of foreign investors—and the US had 
been the country leading efforts to provide full protection to 
investors and facilitating their operations. 
This convergence of policy interests between home and 
host countries as well as developed countries and emerging 
markets, should facilitate reaching a universal agreement—if 
there is the political will to pursue such an objective.
 
The discussion so far has focussed relatively narrowly on 
issues directly related to FDI—or, more broadly, international 
investment. But the emergence of an integrated international 
production system poses challenges that go beyond this 
focus, although a number of them are intimately linked 
to FDI and international investment. They involve the 
governance of firms’ international activities in general, apart 
from the issues that have traditionally been addressed in IIAs. 
A number of instruments already exist that address issues 
raised by the increasing multinationality of firms and the 
emergence of an integrated international production system. 







pricing arrangements, and anti-corruption agreements. The 
question is whether a systematic effort is needed to identify 
the range of such issues and develop responses to them.
For one, the advent of the digital economy and especially 
the increase in the tradability of services is bound to have 
profound implications. The services sector accounts for 
more than half of the total gross domestic product in most 
countries and for over two-thirds in virtually all developed 
countries. The tradability revolution therefore is likely to 
lead to a restructuring of a substantial part of the economies 
of many countries. This, in turn, is bound to cause serious 
adjustment difficulties in those countries whose production 
of the newly tradable services (or parts thereof) is being 
moved abroad. It may also lead to a restructuring of FDI 
flows and stocks. While services account for roughly two-
thirds of FDI flows and stocks—precisely because services in 
the past needed to be produced when and where they were 
consumed—it may become less necessary for services firms 
to engage in FDI to be present in foreign markets. Rather, this 
can be done, as in manufacturing, through (electronic) trade, 
at least to a certain extent. On the other hand, countries 
now have the opportunity to attract FDI geared towards 
the production of entire services or service “components” 
(for example, entering data, analysing insurance bills, or 
doing certain legal research) destined for other parts of a 
global value chain or the world market. This, in turn, creates 
new opportunities for investment promotion agencies 
worldwide, not only by targeting services firms, but also the 
services functions (including research and development) of 
manufacturing and other firms.
Further, the emergence of an integrated international 
production system creates a host of more specific challenges 
going beyond the services sector and involving international 
production in general. Some were already dealt with in the 
past but may need to be revisited, some are in the process of 
being addressed (but perhaps not sufficiently), and some are 
only emerging. 
For example, transfer pricing has since long been recognised 
as an issue. In a world of global value chains and integrated 
international production, it becomes increasingly difficult 
to determine the fair price of specialised goods and services 
being produced in one part of the value chain by a given 
affiliate and provided to other parts of the same corporate 
network or to the network as a whole, and for which there 
are no market prices. How to deal with such situations 
and, in particular, avoid abusive transfer pricing? The 
OECD has developed guidelines in this respect—but are 
they still sufficient for today’s sophisticated global value 
chains? Related to that, how can taxes be determined—and 
allocated—if a given foreign affiliate is not a standalone 
facility but only a part of a global value chain and hence not 
viable on its own? Will it be necessary to move towards some 
sort of unitary taxation system worldwide that allocates 
income across tax jurisdictions on the basis of established 
criteria (as happens among states in the US)? (Such an 
approach could conceivably be implemented by any country 
on its own, which might put pressure on other countries to 
do the same.)
Also related to the emergence of integrated international 
production is the question of the nationality of a firm. If 
a firm was originally established in one country, grew and 
ventured abroad through FDI, and now has the bulk of its 
assets in other countries, with various headquarters functions 
dispersed across various jurisdictions, what nationality 
does that firm have? A clear definition of “nationality” is 
important not only for tax purposes, but also to determine 
whether a firm is protected by a given bilateral investment or 
double taxation treaty. 
Further, what do these developments mean for corporate 
liability, especially in cases of egregious gross negligence? Are 
there situations in which the corporate veil may need to be 
pierced? Conversely, MNEs could dedicate a certain (small) 
percentage of their earnings to corporate social responsibility 
activities in their host countries (or at least the poorest 
among them), to make such activities sustainable and 
more predictable—something that India requires from firms 
located in its territory. 
Finally, in a world of integrated international production, 
is it still possible, let alone efficient, to deal with a number 
of corporate activities on a national basis? Two examples 
illustrate this point. 
The first one concerns bankruptcy. If a large MNE goes 
bankrupt today, not only is its home country directly 
affected, but also the many host countries in which it 
has affiliates. However, most global bankruptcies are still 
administered on a territorial basis, with separate filings in 
each country. In the absence of an international approach 
to bankruptcies, each country seeks to “ring fence” the 
assets located on its territory, with little regard to the 
possible rescue of the enterprise as a whole. This presents a 
problem in a world of global value chains, as, to the extent 
that individual foreign affiliates are fully integrated into their 
corporate networks, they are typically not viable on their 
own. If no solution can be found for the corporate network 
as a whole, both the host and home countries involved are 
negatively affected. With more than 100,000 MNEs (a 
number that is increasing), more and more of them having a 
rising number of affiliates in a growing number of countries, 
and more and more of these affiliates being fully integrated 
into the global value chains of their parent firms, more and 
more complicated bankruptcy cases are likely to occur. No 
international rules for corporate bankruptcies exist (although 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
has developed a Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency). 
Another example for the need of an international approach 
concerns M&As, the principal mechanism through which 
many firms enter foreign markets. If two large MNEs merge, 
the competition authorities in the countries in which each 
of the two have affiliates (not to count the countries that 
may be affected by the merger via trade) may need to vet 
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The growth of FDI and MNE activities, the emergence of 
an integrated international production system, and the 
state of the international investment law and policy regime 
have given rise to a number of challenges that will need to 
be addressed in future investment policy and rule making. 
As the public debate about the investment regime and the 
debate within the international investment law community 
suggest, this has become an urgent matter. 
Accordingly, it would be desirable to launch an informal but 
inclusive confidence-, consensus- and bridge-building process 
on how the international investment law and policy regime 
can be improved. Such a process could seek to identify 
systematically the strengths and weaknesses of the current 
regime and discuss how to deal with them. It could also 
consider a number of the issues that were discussed as not 
being FDI/international investment proper, as many of them 
are intimately linked to it. It would have to be an inclusive 
process and hence involve the principal stakeholders to 
ensure that main interests are taken into account. It could be 
located in an international organisation or initiated by a small 
group of interested countries. If greater informality is desired, 
such a process could be organised by a credible NGO. A 
multi-stakeholder process would also have the advantage 
that all issues would be put on the table. The outcomes 
of such a process could be made available widely and, 
hopefully, help governments to improve the international 
investment law and policy regime. 
The international investment law and policy regime is in flux. 
Like any regime, it can be improved. This presents challenges 
and opportunities. Thoughts need to be given to how 
the regime governing the relations between international 
investors and governments in an area that constitutes the 
most important form of international economic transactions 
in the globalising world economy can be updated. The regime 
needs to be more responsive to the requirements of today’s 
world. It also needs to be responsive to the requirements of 
the world as it is emerging in light of the further growth of 
FDI, the proliferation of MNEs and their foreign affiliates, 
the emergence of an integrated international production 
system, and the imperative to move to a sustainable 
development model of economic development. And it needs 
to be responsive to the expectations that its key stakeholders 
have regarding the regime. Further developing the regime 
is not only necessary for the regime to remain useful for its 
principal stakeholders, but also to warrant its legitimacy and, 







the transaction. Each country has its own review process, 
procedures, criteria, and time-frame for such transactions. 
This can cause delays, uncertainty, costs, and, in some 
cases, the abandonment of merger plans. Moreover, smaller 
countries (and especially developing countries) typically do 
not have the resources and expertise to examine the effects 
that large-scale M&As of this sort may have on them. If 
anything, this issue is becoming more urgent, as reflected in 
the growth of international M&As: The value of cross-border 
M&As rose from US$75 billion in 1987 to a peak of US$1.1 
trillion in 2000, fluctuating then between US$167 billion and 
US$1 trillion a year until 2013. The number of such deals rose 
from 862 to 7,800 over the same period, to reach 8,624 in 
2013. Does an international market for firms necessitate 
international rules for cross-border M&As? 
There are also policy challenges for host countries, and 
regardless of whether they are developed or developing 
ones. If MNEs locate only parts of global value chains 
in individual countries, how can these countries benefit 
from this (potentially very specialised) investment? For 
example, any spill-over and linkage benefits may require 
very specialised local capacities and hence may be of limited 
benefit to the host country, while making the country 
vulnerable to transfers of production if circumstances 
change. At the same time, being linked to global value chains 
may be the only (or at least most convenient and fastest) 
way for countries to become part of the world market. Host 
countries may therefore face new challenges in the future 
that require new policy responses to benefit from FDI as 
much as possible. For example, as discussed earlier, the 
increased tradability of services makes it less necessary to 
locate certain activities in host countries to deliver a service 
there, allowing firms to service those markets through 
electronic trade. Will this lead to localisation requirement, 
a “duty of establishment,” stipulated by host countries for 
certain activities by firms, complementing the traditional 
“right of establishment” by firms?
 
Implemented jointly by ICTSD and the World Economic 
Forum, the E15Initiative convenes world-class experts 
and institutions to generate strategic analysis and 
recommendations for government, business and civil 
society geared towards strengthening the global trade 
system.
